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process. Field research using historical methods for data collection enabled us to trace the
development of each organizationâ s primary processing system back to its beginnings and
provided substantive support for the oscillations that organizations face as they struggle with
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An Historical Analysis of Continual Change
Introduction
To date, most implementation studies have examined the success of an information
system by its acceptance and use at its completion. But if systems are to be utilized as sustainable
resources that support the development and delivery of future products and services, then
researchers must extend their research to include capabilities for future enhancements.
We develop a process model to describe change as it unfolds in systems over time. We
view change as a continual occurrence in systems, planned by organizations or improvised by
individuals and sometimes resulting from the unexpected consequences of one or both.
Cumulative changes define current conditions and the requirements for and constraints inhibiting
future change.
We begin by describing the theoretical underpinnings of our model. Then we describe the
model itself and the historical field study. Next, we describe our findings and finally, we discuss
their implications for researchers and managers.

Theoretical Background
Inertia results when adaptation and refinement of processes and procedures, used to
further the exploitation of current strategy, reduce an organization’s ability to change in noncontinuous ways. Deep structures (Gersick 1991) arise from the interrelationship of components
of a system 1 and the way they work together to maintain organization consistency (Tushman and
Romanelli 1985). Over time, a system will move toward stability for two reasons. First, each
choice made during a system’s implementation and evolution will limit the realm of possible
choices for its future. Second, the patterns of activity that take place within the system’s deep
structures reinforce that course. Occasionally, organizations will be forced to make
discontinuous changes as the buildup of inertia reduces their ability to execute incrementally.
The theory of punctuated equilibrium (Tushman and Romanelli 1985) combines inertia
and discontinuous change. It rejects the notion that systems of the same type must follow the
same patterns or stages of development 2 . Rather, conflicting theories of adaptation and rigidity
might both be applicable to the same system at different times. The organizing principles of a
system change during its life cycle, so no one universal motivating driver can be used to explain
its evolutionary progress. Punctuated equilibrium enables the identification of common
categories of choices and the identification of a system’s state, but it also allows for infinite
variety in the way that events occur in individual systems.
Variation also plays a role in the evolution of systems that support multiple business
units. It is conceptualized as a systemic attribute of systems, resulting from the differing
responses of business units to their individual environments. As units seek to enhance their
1

System refers to the relations among the attributes of entities that achieve a particular output. It is not limited to
information technology.
2

E.g., Lewin’s (1951) freeze, change and refreeze Ginzberg’s (1981) adaptation of the Kolb and Frohman (1970)
model and Rogers (1995) evaluation, adoption and implementation.
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degree of fit with their environments, their products, services, processes and routines come to
vary widely in design and execution. These variations contribute to the performance of
individual units and therefore, to the organization’s performance overall.
To accommodate punctuated equilibrium and variation and to understand the nature of
continual change, we need a model that is neither linear nor rigid. We need to represent how an
organization would change as a system is implemented across multiple units. We also need to
show what would happen when a major revision is carried out, and a second, and a third.
Cause and effect relationships are often disguised by the passage of time and the
continual nature of change. By using a cause map to illustrate change, we uncover those
relationships and demonstrate the development and destruction of deep structure during periods
of evolutionary and revolutionary change in organizations. Cause maps reveal the results of
repeated patterns of interaction through feedback loops. They show the iterative and cyclical
relationships that affect system components, even when they are separated by the passage of time
and intervening events, and even if some of the effects do not become apparent until multiple
iterations occur. Analysis of systemic structures reveals the root causes for their behavior (Senge,
1990).

The Continual Change Model
The process of implementing an information system across an organization results in its
adaptation to meet the needs of the business units that use it (Barley 1986). Even after
implementation is complete, people will continue to refine their practices as they learn to solve
problems with the new technology and processes (Orlikowski 1996). Implementations in
individual units differ because of unique interpretations of requirements (Cooper and Zmud
1990), varying environmental factors (George and King 1991), and the idiosyncrasies of the
units themselves. Variation is the accumulated result of different units adapting the fit of their
system to the requirements of their regulatory or competitive environments. Hence, the greater
the number of units, the more variation across the organization. Increased levels of variation
resulting from the adaptation of an innovation across units of an organization yield better
performance, at least in the short term.
Over time, however, variation has inertial affects. As a new system becomes the resource
into which future innovations must be incorporated, adaptations made to a system’s design
during one implementation will influence the degree of change necessary to implement
subsequent innovations. Therefore, increased levels of variation across units decrease the ease
with which future change can be carried out. Reciprocally, reduction in variation facilitates an
increase in the magnitude of the next change. An oscillation between easier and more difficult
changes is the inevitable result.
Figure 1 portrays how the relationships among performance, perceived need for change
and the ease with which change can occur are all influenced by the level of variation across the
units in a system. The magnitude of any future change will be dependent on the level of
influence of both the perceived need for change and the ease with which changes can be made.
The level of variation in the system as measured across the units of the organization will be
influenced by the magnitude of the change, since it will determine the number and breadth of
opportunities the units have for variation. Opportunities for variation will emerge during
implementation of an innovation into a unit of the organization, so the greater the number of
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units, the greater the potential for variation. Since the magnitude of each change implemented in
the system will vary, the occurrence of any single evolutionary iteration may or may not result in
a significant level of influence over other components of the system. However, the systemic
causal relations between evolutionary change and subsequent variation will eventually influence
decisions to adopt new products and services through the perception of need and the ability to
change. Eventually, the need for change to accommodate internal or external forces may require
a revolutionary change to alter the organization’s deep structures in a way that will reduce
variation in the short term and facilitate future change.

Perceived Need
for Change

Performance

+
+
Magnitude of
Change

+

Variation

+

-

+

Number of
Units

Ease of Future
Change
Figure 1. Model of Continual Change.

The model contains competing loops that oscillate according to the strength of opposing
influences. For instance, if a significant new product were diffused across many units within an
organization, a great degree of variation in the systems that support that product would be
expected. The variation would positively influence performance and negatively influence the
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ability to make changes in the future. With increased performance, there is less perceived need
for change. This, coupled with a decreased ability to change, should reduce the magnitude of
future change. Over time, however, the lack of innovation within the organization will result in
poorer performance and an increase in the perceived need for innovation. Because of the inertia
resulting from previous variation and change, eventually a discontinuous change will be
required. This discontinuity will create a large correction that reduces variation and increases the
organization’s subsequent ability to change (Gallagher and Vandenbosch 2000).

Research Methods
We employed interpretive field research (Klein and Myers 1999) using historical
methods for data collection (Mason, et al 1997) to examine the evolution of systems in four
multi-unit organizations. To do so, we traced the development of each organization’s primary
processing system back to its beginnings, thereby allowing for a sufficient passage of time to
establish the origin of path dependencies (Mason, et al, 1997). Historical methods provide a rich
backdrop for the circumstances in which organizations operate and decisions are made. As an
idiographic research methodology, history stresses the uniqueness of an organizational setting.
Historical analysis also lends itself to the application of nomothetic methods as a way to frame
and compare the causal nature of events. These methods offer the ability to evaluate evolutionary
models by observing patterns of events (Kieser 1994).
We followed the seven-step process for historical analysis outlined by Mason, et al
(1997) for gathering and evaluating the evidence. First we developed a timeline. Primary sources
included forty-nine interviews with current and past employees and archival documentation. All
interviews were taped and transcribed for subsequent analysis. Secondary sources included
industry news, annual reports and published case studies of the organizations. All data were
collected in the first half of 2001. Next, events were verified through further interviews and
document collection. Finally, patterns were analyzed to evaluate how events produced effects
leading to subsequent events.
The study examined a single industry to ensure environmental control. Auto insurance
provided ideal industry characteristics. Because it is regulated at the state level in the U.S., it
offers an industry whose products are sold across multiple units with a variety of information
requirements and product design limitations. Companies can pick and choose states in which to
compete, altering the complexity of the regulatory issues and mix of competitors.
Cases were selected to demonstrate predictability with similar or contrary results (Yin
1988). Since the model theorizes that the number of business units contributes to variation,
companies with national and regional presence were both selected. Companies were also chosen
according to the historical origin of their product: standard or non-standard. Standard
underwriting uses information about an insured as a gate-keeping method, allowing for the
remaining risks to be priced using a simplified and standardized set of variables. Non-standard
companies choose to accept customers regardless of risk, but price them appropriately in order to
insure profitability. Such differences have implications for data collection, underwriting, pricing
and perceptions regarding the need for change. Four organizations enabled us to examine each
situation (Table 1) and are generally considered adequate for achieving theoretical saturation
(Eisenhardt 1989).
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Standard insurance
Non-standard insurance

Regional reach
Alpha
Beta

National reach
Omega
Delta

Table 1. Case study organizations

The Companies
Alpha
Alpha is the most conservative of the four carriers and competes in the fewest number of
states. Marketing its products only in Midwest states through a network of captive agents has
helped Alpha carry out a product strategy based on consistency and an approach to system
design that emphasizes uniformity and standards. To achieve adequate market share in these
states, Alpha expanded its products to include non-standard auto in the 1980s. Just recently, the
company broke with tradition by aggressively expand its geographic scope and updating its
product designs. The company now finds that their ability to deliver new products and services
as fast as it would like has become constrained by the current design of its processing systems,
although it currently has no plans to replace it.
Beta
In contrast, Beta began as a non-standard company and quickly expanded its geographic
scope. Initially the company expanded into twelve states, selling through independent agents. It
then merged with another small non-standard carrier that had grown in a similar fashion, except
this company also sold direct to customers through retail stores and call centers. In contrast to
Alpha’s focus on developing a strong market share in a few states, Beta, as a non-standard niche
player, needed to expand across more states in order to grow in terms of total written premium.
Beta has attempted to keep pace with most of the new product innovations that have
emerged in the last fifteen years. It has remained strictly in the non-standard market. The
company has periodically had to replace parts of its computerized systems in order to restructure
its design, thereby regaining some flexibility lost during the rapid succession of cumulative
changes that accompanied its expansions. Today, the company is again facing serious constraints
to its ability to accommodate change to its processing systems. It hopes to replicate past success,
Beta is once again replacing major portions of its policy processing system.
Delta
Delta also began with a non-standard product. But, unlike Beta, Delta has long competed
nationally and has recently expanded its offerings to include a standard product. For Delta,
continual innovation has resulted in many product changes and much success, but it has also
created the need to frequently reengineer and replace parts of its policy systems. The changes in
product have also accompanied changes in marketing and service design as the company has
expanded into different delivery channels, now selling direct through call centers and on-line, in
addition to existing networks of independent agents and strategic partners.
Omega
Omega also competes nationally, but its mission until recently was primarily to support
its captive life agents with a complimentary auto product. Omega has not expanded the scope of
©Sprouts, 2(3), pp 100-114, http://sprouts.case.edu/sprouts/2002/020307.pdf
Sprouts - http://sprouts.aisnet.org/2-13

105

GALLAGHER AND VANDENBOSCH/AN HISTORICAL ANALYSIS

its product design beyond standard underwriting until just last year. The product has changed
very little, mostly due to Omega’s indifference to product line and its inability to invest in
information technology. In recent years, a change in management brought about a turnaround
effort at Omega. The company rapidly expanded the number of channels used to distribute its
products and moved quickly to develop a more competitive product. To date, the aging and
increasingly inert processing systems have inhibited the organization’s ability to implement its
new products and services. Hence, Omega has begun the process of replacing its policy system.
Data Analysis
Table 2 and Figure 2 both show the timelines of change for each organization. The
timelines in Table 2 document the change events. Figure 2 delineates periods of incremental and
discontinuous movements in the trajectory of each system’s evolution. Incremental events
include expansion or enhancement of the system’s functionality through more automation.
Discontinuous events mark changes that replaced, reengineered or redesigned existing parts of a
system. Both incremental and discontinuous changes accompany changes to the company’s
operations, but with few exceptions, discontinuities became necessary in order to support
changes to products or services. In each case, the existing system had become too inflexible to
accommodate the desired change.
These classifications of events differ significantly by the level of effort required both
technologically and organizationally, as in discontinuous changes existing data and work
processes must be transformed. They also differ in terms of cost and the degree of risk; therefore
discontinuous change efforts are justifiably avoided by management. Figure 2 documents similar
patterns of oscillation among the organizations, yet strikingly different degrees to which
discontinuous changes were undertaken.
While each of these organizations must continually make changes to its product designs
to accommodate the evolving nature of regulatory rules, industry competition and information
technology, they experienced very different degrees of discontinuity over the last two decades.
To analyze the patterns and test the ability of the model to explain the differing patterns of
change and their trajectories, we first compare the evolution of the systems based on the nature
of their products. Then we compare them based on the number of units they support.
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Year
1980
1981
1982

Alpha
Original policy systems

Beta

Delta
Original policy system
System reconfigured into
four virtual regions –
enables growth

1983
1984
1985
1986

1987
1988

Agent reporting system –
provides activity analysis
New policy system –
supports growth
Agent system - provides
remote sales processing

Original policy system
System reconfigured
into 12 divisions supports variation

Document system –print
automation
Rewrite policy system –
add non-standard

Agent system - provides
automated rating
Automate billing system
New agent system – move
to PC technology

1993
1994
1995
Integration of customer
billing across products

1997

New policy system
cancelled – too complex

1998

Update rating engine

2000

Initial agents system –
support rating

Pilot system –standard
product

Replace database –
enables state expansion

Rewrite policy system –
standard product
New direct sales system
New internet sales system

Replace policy system –
enables state expansion

1996

1999

New print and mail
systems

Agent rating disk

1989
1990
1991
1992

Omega
Original policy system

Replace agent rating
system – support sales
across channels
Rewrite policy system expansion into new
channels

2001

Rewrite agent disk –
support new rating
model
Replace policy db –
support new data
requirements
Rewrite direct system
Rewrite internet system
Rewrite print system –
standardize to enable
change

New policy system
cancelled - limited
resources
New rating engine –more
efficient rating
Automated renewals
processing

Replace agent system –
greater data capabilities
for underwriting
Replace policy system –
enables new products
Replace database –
enables new products

Replace billing system –
enable new products

Table 2. Italics: incremental changes; bold: discontinuous change
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8

9

9
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9

9

9

9

9

0

0

Discontinu
Incrementa
Status quo

2B Beta
Discontinu
Incrementa
Status quo

2C Delta
Discontinu
Incrementa
Status quo

2D
Discontinu
Incrementa
Status quo

Figure 2. Continuity and discontinuity in each system’s evolutionary trajectory

Product Segmentation
Standard Products
Alpha. Alpha’s underwriting focus is risk avoidance, so it makes use of simple data
models to price and process policies. Except for the addition of a non-standard auto product in
1988 (see Figure 2A), new product designs were unheard of until a tiered product was introduced
last year. Yet, over time the systems have evolved as changes were made to refine existing
products and processes. Today, the company finds that the structures of the systems are very
difficult to change which is making it difficult to deploy new products.
The infrequency of significant change and the effect that has had on system structures
and organizational performance is in part explained by the company’s overall product strategy.
As the organization remained singularly focused on in-state growth and conservatively followed
the industry, Alpha concentrated on incremental refinements to existing products. There was
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little energy in the organization to undertake discontinuous change, even though it might have
offered an opportunity for renewal. Only in recent years, as performance has been adversely
affected by regional concentration of risks and low policy retention due to increased competition
form more innovative products have new products been developed. And only then did
management realize how inert the systems had become. To date, Alpha has introduced its new
products only in states in which it has not previously competed because constraints within its
policy processing systems required the segregation of new products from existing ones.
Omega. Originally, Omega was first and foremost a life insurance company; the purpose of
the auto product was to provide a compliment or loss leader for life products. Management was
concerned only with maintaining the existing products and systems and had little interest in
innovation. This became increasingly the case as the old system became more and more difficult to
change, which further stifled adaptation to changing market conditions. Not surprisingly,
performance declined. The auto organization’s demand for change was never great enough to alter
this trajectory.
In the model, the absence of change is explained by the relationship between performance
and the perceived need for change. In this case, poorly aligned measures of performance coupled
with inadequate resources to update the system prevented a discontinuous response. The poor
performance was tolerated and the system was allowed to continue deteriorating. In recent years,
perceptions have changed. New management has led the pursuit of innovative new product designs
and new systems to support them (see Figure 2D 1999, 2000). The obstacles the organization now
faces are explained by the buildup of inert structures over time which have reduced the ability to
change. As a result, the development of the new product has prompted the replacement of the entire
existing policy system.
Non-standard Products
Beta. In terms of innovation, Beta is a fast follower in the non-standard auto market.
Beta frequently examines competitor products as well as its own in order to make adjustments,
enhancements and quite often completely redesign them. Each time a major competitor
introduces an innovation, Beta follows, creating systems that are complex and often difficult to
manage. To keep pace with competitors, Beta has had to periodically reprogram and even replace
significant parts of its systems. This has allowed them to re-organize their system to increase the
flexibility in design options they offer to the product managers.
This recurring pattern of change (see Figure 2B) is explained in the model by the
organization’s perceptions of change and the continual update of its products and systems. The
large oscillations in the patterns of change are influenced by the perceived need to develop and
implement new ideas. Ultimately, when change becomes constrained, the perceived need for
change then supports and encourages even larger changes that are required to restructure or
replace the current system, creating a large discontinuous change. These events improve the
ability to change in the short run. But the unrelenting pace of change ultimately results in more
variation across the products as subsequent enhancements are adopted.
Delta. Delta has always had a reputation as an innovator, which includes its use of data, its
pricing methods and its technology. Many ideas have come from product managers who identify
local opportunities for new products. Delta’s product managers historically embarked on
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independent paths of innovation and product development. Experimentation paid off and the
company grew and prospered, but systems became increasingly incompatible. As the company
recognized its inability to share innovations across units and to quickly diffuse new products across
multiple states, uniformity of products became the objective.
Eventually the products were aligned, making innovation diffusion more efficient. However,
the lack of new product ideas resulted in a return to a belief about the need for innovation. Today,
Delta is again allowing product managers to make innovative changes unilaterally. The model
explains these oscillations by examining the dynamic tension between the need for local innovation
and the ability to implement change across a system. The strong drive for product innovation
increases variation, boosting performance, but it also makes change more difficult.

Number of Units
The number of business units also played an important role in the evolution of each
system. Each organization has faced challenges coordinating implementation efforts across and
between units. When a company increases the number of states in which it competes, it must
contend with a greater variety of regulatory rules and a greater number and variety of
competitors. The difference in the products offered by these competitors often requires different
competitive responses in the design of a product.
Regional Reach
Alpha. Alpha has less variation across its units than the other companies because it
markets in fewer states and the states in which it does compete have less diversity of
requirements. Alpha has also dictated standards across all states and has accommodated
exceptions through manual processing. Over time, however, Alpha has continued to refine its
products and processes, adding more underwriting rules and continually automating more policy
processing. The result is an increasingly refined system based on the standard product designs
and processes. The complementary result is variation in processing procedures. Alpha now finds
it increasing difficulty to implement change because of a standardized system that cannot
accommodate a deviation in product design and widely diverse work processes and procedures
that make it very difficult to incorporate the requirements of new states.
Now that Alpha is implementing a new product design it finds it can only do so by
introducing it in states where they have not competed in the past. This expedites implementation
by avoiding existing structures, but increases variation, both in the automated and manual
systems.
The model explains the inertial effects that Alpha is experiencing. Small changes are the
norm, so when larger changes are requested, they result in implementation delays and manual
workarounds. This contributes to variation in the system as different units employ different and
distinct products and processes, which become an obstacle to changing the system in the future.
Beta. Beta’s strategy for growth has focused on adding states and expanding its geographic
reach. Early in its history, state expansion and product changes were constrained by limitations in
the system. As the company expanded, it faced new and increasingly difficult challenges in
designing its products to accommodate significant differences in the design requirements for new
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states. As a result, variation increased with the addition of more states. As the system became
increasingly inflexible, innovation and growth became stifled, which affected performance. The
company replaced its database (see Figure 2B 1993), then its quoting system (see Figure 2B 1995)
to provide greater flexibility. Since that time, the programmers at Beta have worked hard to build
systems that will accommodate change.
The model explains that changes of a larger magnitude across more states combine to
create increasing levels of variation in a system. As perceptions of need continued to fuel
change, the IS department focused on building flexible designs and improving their ability to
change. But again the system has restricted the organization’s ability to respond to its changing
needs. The current rewrite (see Figure 2B 2000) once again exemplifies a discontinuous change
made in order to regain flexibility and support the variations needed to sustain performance.
National Reach
Delta. The strategy at Delta was to identify and capitalize on local knowledge of a state,
resulting in a great deal of explicit variation. Later, systems were regionalized to make processing
units more efficient and then divisionalized to allow programmers to acquire and leverage
knowledge of specific states. The variation across products in the current system contributed to the
performance of individual units and the company’s overall aggregate performance, but it also created
obstacles to change. That realization brought about efforts to reengineer the systems (see Figure 2C
1993) in conjunction with four successive rollouts of an increasingly standardized product.
Today, the products and systems at Delta are more standardized than ever and the
organization has become very efficient at delivering changes, in part by reducing variation. But, now
the organization feels a need to become more innovative, so it is allowing units to evolve
independently.
These patterns are explained in the model. By reducing the level of variation in the system,
Delta was able to execute changes more efficiently. Delta then recognized that high levels of
standardization in a world of diverse regulations and competitors adversely affects performance. As
explained in the model, performance requires the ability to accommodate local needs, which in
aggregate yields increasing levels of variation.
Omega. As discussed above, the strategy at Omega focused on providing a
complementary product. Over the course of time, however, the mix of business rules and aging
code resulting from incremental changes made the systems increasingly complex and inert.
Thereafter, variation became more prevalent as the inability to implement change led to diffusing
new products and services selectively to states where changes met the least resistance or where
the impact to performance was greatest. This method of prioritization contributed to increasing
variation across the forty-seven states and to decreasing the ability to change.
Omega’s situation exemplifies variation’s dualistic role in a system. Omega was able to
increase performance by delivering change to its states, and as change became more difficult,
Omega became increasingly selective. Adding an enhancement to some states and not others
introduced more variation. Now the perceived need for a new product is driving the
implementation of a new system. Yet, practices of selective diffusion persist because of the
short-term benefits to performance, despite any long-term cost to flexibility.
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Discussion
The model explains the emergence of oscillating patterns of change in a system created
by the need to alter the products and services it supports over time. An important component of
the model is the degree to which variation emerges as a systemic variable, its ability to contribute
to performance and the degree to which it may constrain the ability to change the system in the
future. Since variation emerges across multiple units in a system, diversity in the number of units
that an organization serves provides one way to examine the model’s robustness and its ability to
explain patterns of change.
Additionally, the model takes into account how change influences management’s
perceptions about the evaluation of performance and the need for future change. This component
concerns the choices managers make about where and how to compete and influences how
products are designed and marketed over time. Comparing companies that have chosen to
compete differently based on their product designs provides a way to examine the theory’s
ability to explain the dynamics of change in the systems of these four organizations.
In the two standard companies, the way in which performance was measured and the way
changes were perceived slowed the evolution of systems and thereby dampened the oscillating
cycles of change. Yet, these organizations still experienced an inability to change because of the
levels of variation across their state product designs. Changes accumulated over time to form
increasingly complex structures both in the design of the products and the processes that
supported them. Once perceptions about change were altered and the organizations moved to
implement new products or to expand their presence to additional states, the inert state of their
systems became noticeable. Large changes, such as replacing a policy processing system, are
discontinuous changes, which break from the current trajectory of the system and reduce inertia,
making future changes easier.
In contrast, the perceptions of performance in the non-standard companies promoted
change. The dynamics of their industry promoted and rewarded innovation, which led to using
more and different data. Together, the complexity of the systems, combined with the dynamics
of constant change in products and services, brought about continual changes in the systems at
both companies. These dynamics sped the environmental cycles of continuous and discontinuous
change in the systems, making variation across the units a critical factor in the success of their
products. But, in both organizations, variation in the system in combination with the dynamics
and magnitude of change, created significant barriers to implementing change, which led to
many discontinuous changes.

Conclusion
In this study, the size of the organizations and the nature of their product market
strategies were used to evaluate the dynamics of change. The analysis demonstrates the value of
the model, in explaining how the number of units in a system will influence the level of variation
and the subsequent ability of an organization to implement change. It also explains how the
orientation of the products and services supported by a system influences its development and
the demand for changes to it. A niche market strategy and the perceived need to change product
designs were shown to create larger oscillations in the patterns of inertia and change. Conversely,
stability in a product and the perceptions regarding performance also influenced the patterns of
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change, resulting in long periods of incremental change and adaptation that caused inertia over
time.
This research expands our understanding of diffusion, implementation and information
systems change research by modeling the dynamic interaction of events that set the stage for
future change. For practitioners it provides a model of change that lends insight into the
distributed and delayed effects of change. These effects manifest themselves by inhibiting
change, but go unnoticed until change is most desired and least accessible.
IS researchers have examined resistance to change as an obstacle to successful
implementations, but have not examined sources of structural inertia that are used to explain
obstacles to organizational adaptation. An important question for future research is how
organizations can manage the constraints that form in systems over time and across multiple
units.
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